University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2003

The Culture of Arbitration
Tom Ginsburg

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tom Ginsburg, "The Culture of Arbitration," 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1335 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

The Culture of Arbitration
Tom Ginsburg*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

1336
1340
1341

III.

LEGAL CULTURE AND ARBITRATION ...............................
W HOSE CULTURE? ....................... . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .
EXPLAINING ARBITRATION CULTURE .............................

IV .

CONCLUSION .................................................................
1345

II.

The relationship between "legal culture" and the practice of
international arbitration has received increasing attention in recent
years. Many see arbitration as a meeting point for different legal
cultures, a place of convergence and interchange wherein
practitioners from different backgrounds create new practices. Some
have suggested that this process has led to an emergent
"international arbitration culture" fusing together elements of the
common law and civil law traditions.1 Others see arbitration as a
locus of conflict among traditions 2 or as competition among various
3
players.
This comment contests the view that the current state of
convergence in arbitration is properly considered a cultural

* Associate Professor and Director, Program in Asian Law, Politics and Society,
University of Illinois College of Law, Urbana-Champaign. Thanks to Tom Ulen,
Ilhyung Lee, Thanh Do, and Chris Drahozal for very helpful comments.
1.
See generally INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TOWARDS AN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed., 1998); Siegfried
H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in
Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 59 (2002); Marcus S. Jacob, The Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial
Principles of Dispute Resolution Within the Context of International Commercial
Arbitration, 16:12 MEALEY'S ARB. REP. 32 (2001); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313 (2003); Lara M.
Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the Differences Between Cultures Still Influence
InternationalCommercial Arbitration Despite Harmonization?,9 ILSA J. INT'L COMP.
L. 57 (2002).
2.

See CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

OLD

ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999)
(considering the resolution of differences arising among parties coming from different
legal cultures).
3.
See generally Christian Borris, The Reconciliation of Conflicts Between
Common Law and Civil Law Principles in the Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING
LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 1-18
(Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider, eds., 1999) (cultural conflict); Michael Kerr,
Concord and Conflict in InternationalArbitration, 13 ARB. INT'L 121 (1997) (harmony
and discord in international arbitration); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING
IN VIRTUE 54 (1996) (competition).
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phenomenon. It argues that the phenomenon of convergence is driven
primarily by economic rather than cultural factors, and that claims of

an arbitration culture reflect the anticompetitive impulse of those
already in the business. I argue that convergence in rules and norms
is better understood as the result of competition to capture network
benefits in the rapidly expanding field of international commercial
arbitration.

I.

LEGAL CULTURE AND ARBITRATION

Legal scholars talk about culture in two ways. First, there is the
notion of a general legal culture, which is usually taken to mean
those aspects of national culture that find expression in the legal
system. 4 We speak regularly of Japanese legal culture, French legal
culture and U.S. legal culture as well as, more broadly, a civil law and
common law culture. 5 As Friedman put it, legal culture consists of the
"attitudes, values and opinions held in society with regard to law, the
legal system and its various parts. '6 These values might be expressed
as a preference for arbitration over litigation, for oral procedures over
written ones, or for punitive remedies, to mention only a few
7
examples.

4.

David Nelken, Toward a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL

CULTURES 7, 25 (D. Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) (legal culture "points to

differences in the way features of law are themselves embedded in larger frameworks
of social structure and culture which constitute and reveal the place of law in society.");
see also CSABA VARGA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 1-83 (1992) (discussing the roots
of Western legal culture). See generally COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken
ed., 1997).
5.
See e.g., Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, "Weightier Than a Mountain":
Duty, Hierarchy, and the Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45 (1996)
(discussing Japanese legal culture); Alain Lembereur, Negotiation and Mediation in
France: The Challenge of Skill-based Learning and InterdisciplinaryResearch in Legal
Education, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 151 (1998) (discussing French legal culture);
Christian Atais & Alain A. Levasseur, American Culture and Traditional Scholarly
Order,46 LA. L. REV. 1117 (1986) (discussing U.S. legal culture).
6.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 76 (1977);
see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
15 (1975) (legal culture is "those parts of general culture--customs, opinions, ways of
doing and thinking that bend social forces toward or away from the law"). Cf. Roger
Cotterell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 4,
at 13-14 (critiquing the above viewpoint).
7.
See Richard H. Kreindler, Arbitration or Litigation? ADR Issues in
Transnational Disputes, 52 DISP. RES. J. 79 (1997) (examining the factors that come
into play in the choice between arbitration and U.S. courts); see also Amanda Stallard,
Note, Joining The Culture Club: Examining Cultural Context When Implementing
InternationalDispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RES. 463, 463 (2002) (observing
that international disputes involve collision of "dispute resolution cultures").
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This idea of culture conceptualizes culture as a feature of the
decision making environment of legal actors. It posits that prior
cultural endowments create the preferences behind certain choices,
either procedural or substantive. 8 The preferences of legal actors are
exogenously produced by the national culture or legal tradition and
will shape behavior.9 This approach emphasizes the relative
immutability and constraining effect of culture on legal choices. 10 It
also implies that culture will dictate outcomes even when it is costly,
that is, when rational cost-benefit calculation would not produce the
same result.11
A second notion of culture contemplates culture as consisting of
shared norms and expectations produced by legal actors. Actors
engaged in repeated interaction over time produce culture. 12 Lawyers
form an epistemic community, that is, a community of professionals
with common training and expertise. 13 This common training and
expertise, combined with interactive practices, produces a common
set of expectations. 14 These expectations, in turn, shape behavior,
though they are also subject to change as new norms arise. 15 This
notion emphasizes the dynamism of culture. It is culture as a product
of law rather than constraint on law, an effect rather than a cause.
Broadly speaking, globalization leads to pressure on legal
cultures in the first sense of fixed endowments of ideas: national legal
cultures that were more or less autonomous are now subject to a
variety of external pressures because of the growing rate of crossnational interaction. But precisely because of this cross-national
interaction, globalization produces culture in the second sense. One
arena in which this plays out is international commercial arbitration.
Hence, there is increasing discussion of a culture of arbitration, a
transnational culture common to practitioners, arbitrators and

8.
See Kriendler, supra note 7, at 79, 80.
9.
See Stallard, supra note 7, at 463, 473-82.
10.
Id. at 473.
11.
See Frommel & Rider, supra note 2, at 1-18.
12.
See Peter M. Haas, Introduction:Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (acknowledging that the shared beliefs of
knowledge-based experts can lead to similar patterns of behavior within different
cultures).
13.
One commentator has noted:
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and ... [has] a common policy
enterprise-that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems
to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the
conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.

Id. at 3.
14.
15.

Id. at 3.
Id.
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parties involved in arbitral practice. 16 The culture of arbitration
typically refers to the gradual convergence in norms, procedures and
17
expectations of participants in the arbitral process.
Professor Kaufmann-Kohler describes this phenomenon quite
nicely.1 8 She demonstrates the phenomenon of convergence in a
number of areas. She argues that the dominant test for determining
the law governing arbitration proceedings is now the objective or
territorial test, in which the law of the seat of the arbitration
applies. 19 She also notes convergence on the role of the tribunal in
setting its rules and in deciding procedural matters. 20 Procedures
have also converged around a blend of oral and written procedure,
with a strong tendency toward oral hearings, written witness
statements and reliance on experts but subject to limitations and
control by the panel. 21 Even the dreaded Anglo-American discovery
practice has been adopted in a limited form, tamed by the moderating
22
influence of commercial arbitration.
Further convergence is found in the ability of the tribunal to
23
determine its own jurisdiction, the so-called kompetenz kompetenz,
and provisions for severability of the arbitral clause, without which
arbitration would be severely constrained. 24 Another example argued
to reflect cultural convergence is the substantial agreement on the
general principles of arbitration, such as party autonomy and the

16.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3; see generally van den Berg, supra note 1;
Horacio A. Grigera Na6n, Latin American Arbitration Culture and the ICC Arbitration
System, in Frommel & Rider, supra note 2, at 117; Leonel Pereznieto Castro,
Commercial Arbitration in Mexico, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 29, 32 (2000) (discussing
enforcing foreign awards even if not from New York Convention signatories); Brett
Fulkerson, A Comparison of Commercial Arbitration: the United States and Latin
America, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L L 537, 566 (2001) (NAFTA harmonizing arbitration
culture); Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition And Innovation In
InternationalArbitrationProcedure,30 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 89, 91-104 (1995).
van den Berg, supra note 1, at 31-34.
17.
18.
See generally Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1.
19.
Id. at 1315. See also UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 1(2).
20.
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 1321-22. See also ICC RULES, art. 15
(1998) (panel can decide procedural rules where none provided or chosen rules silent);
LCIA RULES art. 22 (1998) (a range of procedural powers); AAA INT'L RULES, art. 16
(1997) (subject to the rules, tribunal can conduct arbitration "in whatever manner it
considers appropriate").
See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Arbitration as Omelette: What
21.
Goes into the Mix, in Frommel & Rider, supra note 2, at 19, 24 (oral procedures); Serge
Lazareff, International Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural Approach, in
Frommel & Rider, supra note 2, at 31, 35 (limited hearing).
22.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 26 (observing that discovery in arbitration
is a "genuine compromise"); Elsing & Townsend, supra note 1, at 61 (compromise over
discovery); see also IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999).

23.
24.

Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 30 (Eng.).
Lazareff, supra note 21, at 31.
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need for procedural fairness. 25 Finally, the spread of the Model Law
and the New York Convention have been major forces pushing toward
26
uniformity.
It is worth noting that the emergent arbitration culture does not
reflect the hegemony of the Anglo-American law firm, as some would
have it. 27 On balance, the various shifts may have encouraged
arbitration to become more like Anglo-American style litigation, but
this shift is far from complete. 28 Indeed, there are signs that U.S.
arbitration practice may be shifting toward international practice on
a number of dimensions. The American Arbitration Association has
recently amended its Rules for Commercial Arbitration so that partyappointed arbitrators are expected to be neutral, as in all
international rules, unless the parties specify otherwise. 29 Professor
Park's article in this Symposium, calling for modest amendment of
the FAA along the lines of the Model Law with regard to judicial
review of international awards, is another example. 30 Park really
calls for the United States to join the global arbitration culture on
this point, displacing our national "legal culture" of judicial
31
autonomy, rights consciousness and inconsistent decision making.
In this sense, both Professor Kaufmann-Kohler and Professor Park
address responses to globalization with Kaufmann-Kohler's approach
being descriptive and Park's more normative.

25.
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 1321-22; see also Borris, supra note 3,
at 3 (noting that arbitration laws converge on principles of party autonomy).
26.
See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN MODEL
LAW JURISDICTIONS (2000); IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, ICCA
CONGRESS NO. 9 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999).
27.
See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and
the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 384 (2003) (arguing that
U.S. legal hegemony requires 'resistance'). See also Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong
and Independent Judiciaries Through the New Law and Development: Behind the
Paradox of Consensus Programsand Perpetually DisappointingResults, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 383, 397 (2002) (observing that U.S. expertise is hegemonic). But see DEZALAY &
GARTH, supra note 3, at 60-61 (noting that results of contest over arbitration not clear
and will be provisional).
28.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3, at 60-61.
29.
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, R-12(b),
American Arbitration Assoc. (2003). For the traditional distinction between U.S. and
international practice in this regard, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed
Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59
(1995) (discussing the benefits of party-appointed arbitrators in international
commercial arbitration); Richard M. Mosk, The Role of Party-AppointedArbitrators in
InternationalArbitration: The Experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 1 TRANS.
LAW 253 (1988) (describing the role of party-appointed arbitrators of the Iran-U.S.
claims tribunal).
30.
William W. Park, The Specificity of InternationalArbitration: The Case for
F.A.A. Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241 (2003).
31.
Id. at 1269-73.
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II. WHOSE CULTURE?
Arbitral practices have indeed converged to a certain degree. But
because of the private structure of arbitration, it is difficult to tell if
all this is really "culture" in the sense of shared expectations among
those who are participants in the process. Much of the evidence for
convergence comes from the evolution of rules of arbitral institutions
and national law, but we really do not know how extensively these
are used as a percentage of total arbitration practice. 32 Empirical
research on arbitration is notoriously difficult to conduct since the
only cases we learn about are those that are reported, for some
reason, or appealed. 33 Indeed, much of what we do know about
arbitration comes from these possibly aberrant cases. 34 Although
certain sources for arbitral decisions exist, such as Mealey's
Arbitration Reporter and the ICC redacted awards, they are but the
tip of the iceberg of all the cases produced.3 5 Furthermore, the ICC
awards are an explicitly biased sample as the ICC seeks to publish
36
particularly interesting or unusual awards.
In this context, the work of various scholar-practitioners (such as
Professors Kaufmann-Kohler and Park) serves as an important
source of information on arbitration in practice. They draw on their
experiences in producing articles that both describe and develop
arbitration. In arbitration, perhaps more than any other field of law,
the line between scholar and practitioner is blurred so that many
leading scholars are involved in arbitrations, and many leading
arbitrators take the time to write academic articles and books. 37 Like
the grand civil-law tradition, it is scholarly commentary that

32.
Id. at 1269-76; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 1220.
33.
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of
Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 23, 24
(2003) (observing that empirical studies are few but growing in number).
34.
See Park, supra note 30, at 1246-47 (discussing Alghanim v. Toys R' Us,
126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997)).
35.
See e.g., ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1971-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains
eds., 1990); ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-90 (Sigvard Jarvin et al. eds., 1994); ICC
ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991-95 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds., 1997) (offering extracts
of arbitral awards in the form of a collection). Arbitrations involving states have
produced more volume.
36.

W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

ARBITRATION 338 n.62, 639 n.39 (3d ed. 2000).
37.
See, e.g., id.; CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRANUNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998) (discussing the establishment and
contribution to international arbitration resulting from the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal);
GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (1996) (summarizing and analyzing the tribunal's jurisprudence); JULIAN
D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1987).
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produces the law and technique of arbitration. 38 The role of scholars
is enhanced because the other potential sources of lawmaking,
namely legislators and judges, 39 are called on only when the
relatively autonomous system of commercial arbitration turns to
national legal systems for support or enforcement. 40 Nor can arbitral
practice directly contribute to the norm-creation function because of
the need for confidentiality. 41 Scholarly (and institutional) production
of arbitration law and rules fills the void.

III.

EXPLAINING ARBITRATION CULTURE

Dezalay and Garth's influential study, Dealing in Virtue, uses
Pierre Bourdieu's construct of a social field to understand the
evolution of arbitration into the preferred mode of international
dispute resolution. 42 Their story is one of competition among "the
grand old men" and the large Anglo-American law firm over the rules
of the game. 43 Arbitration has moved from a small number of "grand
old men" (who in many cases shared a culture in our first sense, that
of being from a common legal tradition) to a broad-based practice of
major law firms operating in a global market. 44 Each group seeks and
deploys "symbolic capital" in these struggles. 45 This contested process
has produced the current (unstable) state of affairs that others call
46
the culture of arbitration.
I agree with the outlines of Dezalay and Garth's basic story, but I
do not think we need notions of "symbolic capital" or culture to
understand it. I do not see the production of rules and commentary by
'47
scholars and institutions as an effort to build up "symbolic capital.

38.
See JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985); see also
Fabrizio Marella, Choice of Law in Third Millennium Arbitrations: The Relevance of
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1137, 1142 (2003) (UNIDROIT principles produced by "cultural
mediation of legal scholars").
39.
See generally R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS
(1987) (offering a comparative analysis of the production of law in common law and
civil-law countries).
40.

See MERRYMAN, supra note 38.

41.

See Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the

Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT'L L.

REV. 969 (2001) (considering the arguments for and against the duty of confidentiality
in international commercial arbitration).
42.

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3, at 16.

43.

Id. at 16, 18.

44.

Id. at 18.

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 18-29.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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Their notion does not really explain why convergence has occurred, or
have the potential to account for why we have seen the particular
convergences we have.
I want to suggest instead that there is a relatively simple
economic explanation for the production of the common arbitral
culture under conditions of globalization. In doing so, I draw on a
recent article by Professor Anthony Ogus, providing an economic
perspective on legal culture which I find useful in thinking about the
culture of arbitration. 48 Ogus focuses on the concept of network
benefits. 49 Networks in economics are systems in which users are
linked, and network goods are those for which a user's benefit
increases as the number of network users increases. 50 The paradigm
network good is the telephone, which is useless unless others also
own telephones. As more people own them, the more useful they
become. The Windows operating system is another prominent
example-having established itself as the standard, one incurs costs
in the form of lost network benefits in order to switch to a new
system.
A legal culture, Ogus argues, is a combination of procedures and
concepts that "constitute a network which, because of the
'51
commonality of usage, reduces the costs of interactive behavior.
Culture becomes a kind of template for social interaction, and
members of the same legal culture find it easier to work with each
other than with outsiders. When legal cultures compete, lawyers
become benefit as more people members of their particular network
or legal culture; this explains some of the intense competition to
educate and train lawyers from around the world or to export rules
52
from a home jurisdiction.
Arbitration culture can be described similarly as a network. The
rapid spread of arbitration makes it more likely that parties will be
familiar with it as a dispute resolution option, creating more business
for arbitrators. But it also creates demand for new rules and intense
competition to define the network. We thus see the spread and
continuous updating of arbitration rules to capture some of the
"market" for arbitral business as well as to set the standard for future
interactions. We see the emergence of draft rules, contract terms and
principles from organizations like UNIDROIT, the International Bar

48.
Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and
Monopolization, 22 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 419 (2002).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 422. See also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998) (exploring the application
of network economic theory in the field of law).
51.
Ogus, supra note 48, at 420.
52.
Garth, supra note 27, at 395.
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Association and UNCITRAL, to name only a few. 53 The rules of
various arbitral institutions, which reflect substantial convergence on
many important questions, are another example. 54 We also see
practitioner-scholars competing with each other to establish and
influence the shape of the law.
Another sign of the rush to establish and join networks is the
modernization of national arbitration laws. The numbers of
arbitrations held in most jurisdictions would hardly justify the
legislative effort to pass a new arbitration law designed to make the
jurisdiction an attractive situs. 55 But when one factors in the network
benefits to be obtained by conforming one's own law to that of other
jurisdictions, the rapid production of new laws makes more sense.
Having domestic lawyers with a working familiarity of the Model
Law, for example, not only helps those lawyers compete for business
overseas, but it can also make them more sophisticated negotiators
with foreign investors concerning arbitration clauses. Particularly
when one thinks of the Model Law jurisdictions, the spread of
regulatory structures conducive to arbitration may benefit all states
in that making arbitration easier abroad makes it easier at home as
well.
Another good example of a network type rule in arbitration is the
New York Convention. By requiring enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards with relatively minimal scrutiny, the New York Convention
resolves a collective action problem among states. 56 Each jurisdiction
might ideally desire to exercise strong review of awards for
conformity with local law, but, if they do so, other jurisdictions will
not enforce awards in favor of their nationals. All economies are
better off with recognition of foreign arbitral awards. These benefits
increase as more economies observe the Convention since lawmakers

53.
See generally Sandra M. Rocks & B. Shea Owens, Survey of International
Commercial Law Developments, 56 BUS. LAW. 1867 (2001) (discussing the
establishment of legal mechanisms aimed at facilitating international commercial
arbitration).
54.
See e.g., Richard Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Becoming an International
Arbitrator: Qualifications, Disclosures, Conduct and Removal, in PRACTITIONERS
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION (Rufus Rhoades et al.

eds., 2001) (describing institutional rules on disclosure, appointment, and other areas).
55.
Cf. Christopher Drahozal, The Effect of Competition Among Arbitral Venues
on Choice of Situs in ICC ArbitrationProceedings (University of Kansas School of Law,
Working Paper 2002) (finding a statistically significant increase in ICC proceedings in
a country after adoption of a new statute, but of very small magnitude); KLAUS PETER
BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 6 n.55 (1993) (arguing that new

statutes are a signal to international arbitration community).
56.
See generally H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Jack P. Smith III, Statutory
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards in the United States, 15 INT'L L.

PRACTICUM 54 (2002) (analyzing the principal provisions of the New York Convention
and their application by U.S. courts).
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cannot anticipate in advance where their entrepenuers will need to
enforce awards.
In thinking about the particular details of convergence, an
economic perspective would contrast those areas of law where we
would expect a single "network" standard to emerge against those
where we would not. If there are efficiency advantages to particular
rules, we might expect a trend toward harmonization under
conditions of market competition. Indeed, long time observers of the
arbitral process have observed greater efficiencies over time. 57 Note
that I am not making a broad claim about the efficiency of arbitration
as a whole: secrecy in arbitration prevents any mechanism of case-bycase lawmaking such as has been claimed to lead to the efficiency of
the common law. 58 But the transparent nature of institutional rules
and competition for business among the institutions might lead to at
least an evolution of efficient procedural rules.
In other areas, where there are not substantial gains in
efficiency or uniformity or harmonization, we might expect more
divergence. Here competition to establish the network standard could
be associated with monopolistic behavior and may be undesirable.
Ogus expects that in national jurisdictions lawyers will control the
content of legal culture and will use the notion defensively against
outside competition. 59 In this view, culture can be an anti-competitive
product. 60 Those inside the relatively closed world of international
arbitration can use claims of an "arbitration culture" to highlight
their own expertise. 6 1 Those who are "outside the culture" are less
62
desirable participants.
We can now see why claims about a "culture of arbitration" have
expanded in recent years. As arbitration has expanded, the value of
controlling the network standard has increased, leading to new
efforts to promulgate rules and standards. The larger and more
diverse the network, the more pronounced the need for common
expectations. 6 3 At the same time, claims of culture help to keep
outsiders on the outside. 64 We ought to be cautious about embracing
this latter characteristic of arbitration culture.

57.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, InternationalArbitration as Omelette: What Goes
into the Mix, in Frommel & Rider, supra note 2, at 19.
58.
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53
(1977) (observing that common law is likely to be efficient because of pressures to
overturn bad precedent).
59.
Ogus, supra note 48, at 427.
60.
Id. at 426-29.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
van den Berg, supranote 1, at 23-54.
64.
Ogus, supra note 49, at 427.
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In short, the main mechanisms of convergence are likely to be
economic rather than cultural. At the same time, economic factors
may in part explain why it is so common to describe the results of
convergence as a cultural phenomenon. Pressures for more rules lead
to competition to establish new network standards. The network
standards provide a template for action, and everyone benefits by
following it. Culture becomes a shorthand way of referring to this set
of standards.
This approach also provides a language for predicting and
evaluating the precise areas of convergence in arbitration to the
extent we can overcome the empirical problems to learn what is
actually happening. In this sense, it is superior to Dezalay and
Garth's undifferentiated notion of "symbolic capital" which predicts
only that observed convergences are the result of power struggles and
are unstable as a result. 65 Symbolic capital does not tell us why the
winners won, whereas economics can help us understand why
particular rules become the network standard and others do not.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This comment has highlighted the economic role in creating the
international arbitration culture. As institutions evolve under
competitive pressures, expectations converge and create a demand for
a "culture" of common practice. It is culture in the internal sense, a
product of law rather than something that explains the outcome or
constrains the process. The arbitration culture can be facilitative,
encouraging effective communication and an efficient arbitration
process. Alternatively, it can be monopolistic, trying to keep new
entrants out with cultural claims. As the culture of arbitration
evolves, it will be interesting, though difficult, to try to determine
which outcome occurs.

65.

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3, at 18-27.
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